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 1 
President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition: 
an Antitrust Analysis 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
 In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive 
Order (EO) directed to promoting competition in the American 
economy.1  Another closely related recent action by the Federal Trade 
Commission, not mentioned by the EO, is the withdrawal of its 2015 
“Statement of Enforcement Principles.”2 That statement did two 
things, both of which were regarded as narrowing the FTC’s ability to 
bring more expansive antitrust claims.  First, it observed that the 
Commission would be guided by what it called the “consumer 
welfare” principle, although without explaining the meaning of that 
term.  Second, it stated that practices evaluated under §5 of the FTC 
Act would be evaluated under “a framework similar to the rule of 
reason.”3 
 This withdrawal is significant because it may open the way for 
the FTC to do more things along the lines that the EO contemplates.  
Although the withdrawal has produced some hand wringing even from 
sources such as the Washington Post editorial board,4 repeal of this 
statement is overall a good thing.  First, the rule of reason has become 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law 
School and the Wharton School. 
1Exec. Order No. 14036 on Promoting Competition in the American 
Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021). 
2Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of 




4 Opinion: Don’t Want the FTC to Act on Antitrust? Tell Congress to Get 
Moving, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 12, 2021), at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/11/dont-want-ftc-act-
antitrust-tell-congress-get-moving/.  
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a powerful vehicle for antitrust underenforcement, a point that even 
conservative Justice Gorsuch acknowledged in his recent decision in 
NCAA v. Alston.5  Second, the Washington Post Editorial Board 
writes as if the Sherman Act applies relatively clear rules while §5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act permits unspecified overreaching.  
That is simply not the case.  The language of the Sherman Act 
(“restrain trade” and “monopolize”)6 is not appreciably clearer or more 
specific than is §5 of the FTC Act (“unfair methods of competition”).7  
Further, nothing in any of the statutes suggests a consumer welfare 
principle nor the years of judge made law that has defined it, including 
the rule of reason.  What §5 lacks is a long line of antitrust precedents 
that define its reach in a way similar to the extensive case law 
interpreting the equally opaque provisions of the Sherman Act.  In fact, 
important precedents in competition law prior to the issuance of this 
statement of principles interpreted §5 as not reaching very far beyond 
the Sherman Act.8 
 Third, there is a good reason for using §5 of the FTC Act to 
reach beyond the Sherman Act: as a standalone provision §5 cannot be 
enforced by private plaintiffs.  Much of the overreaching in the 
antitrust laws has come about in private actions, motivated mainly by 
the availability of treble damages and attorneys’ fees.9  As a result, 
when the FTC wants to use §5 to reach out it need not worry about 
debilitating damages actions and – what frequently goes with them – 
jury trials. 
 
5NCAA vs. Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2160 (2021).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
A Miser’s Rule of Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and the Alston 
Antitrust Case (SSRN Working paper, July 6, 2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3879580.  
6 15 U.S.C. 1, 2. 
7 15 U.S.C. §45. 
8 E.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(refusing to condemn parallel pricing plus facilitating practices as collusive 
in the absence of evidence of an agreement). 
9 15 U.S.C. §15. 
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 While repeal of the FTC Act §5 Statement of Enforcement 
Principles is a good thing, it should come with one warning: it does 
not turn §5 into a tort statute or a license to go after private wrongs that 
do not injure competition.  One common criticism of the FTC v. Brown 
Shoe decision, which first applied this expansionist principle, was that 
Brown Shoe was not doing anything anticompetitive.10 It was 
imposing exclusive dealing (“single branding”) on a large number of 
small retail stores that sold its shoes, effectively turning them into its 
franchisees.  The market was unconcentrated, and Brown’s own 
market share was small.11  Further, the individual franchise stores were 
free to terminate their franchise agreements at will, and even under the 
franchise agreements about 25% of their sales were from 
competitors.12  Today a ruling this broad would very likely wipe out 
the franchise agreements of many of the larger fast foods chains and 
the automobile industry. The Court simply did not understand how 
modern distribution systems work.  Rather, it was based on a quaint 
image of an economy in which small manufacturers produced their 
products and were done.  Retailers purchased and resold them at will. 
 Being able to reach a wide range of conduct under §5 of the 
FTC Act is a good thing so long as the FTC keeps in mind that it is 
still addressing problems of competition, which means that it should 
be concerned with practices that realistically threaten to reduce market 
wide output but that may not be reachable under the Sherman Act. 
 While the President’s Executive Order has been touted as a 
“Progressive” document,13 its content falls short of that.  It does not 
suggest that the antitrust enforcement agencies break up any firms, 
other than becoming more aggressive about mergers.  Nor does it 
 
10 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
11 See the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, 339 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir. 1964). 
12 Id at 50. 
13 See Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, Biden Turns Back the Progressive Clock, 
Wall Street Journal (July 14, 2021, 2:12 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-turns-back-the-progressive-clock-
11626286594. 
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contain any general expression of concern about vertical integration as 
such or advocacy for removal of antitrust immunities.   Consistent with 
antitrust policy generally, it repeatedly expresses concerns about 
market power, or the power to profit by charging high prices, but it 
never complains about large firm size as such.14  Further, while it 
discusses market power repeatedly, it does not speak about displacing 
antitrust’s current economic approach with concerns about political 
power or large firm size.  To the contrary, it makes no reference to 
political power at all, except for this one telling passage that it quotes 
from a 1957 Supreme Court decision declaring that the Sherman Act: 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our 
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and 
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing 
an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic political and social institutions.15 
 
 The passage is important for what it does not say about political 
power, even during a period of great antitrust expansion.  The goals 
are to achieve the best allocation of economic resources, lowest prices, 
highest quality, and greatest material progress – but all of this within 
an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic 
institutions.  That is hardly an endorsement of the proposition that 
antitrust should ignore economic concerns in favor of political ones.  
It could as easily have been written by Friedrich Hayek or Milton 
Friedman. 
 
Of course, rule making of unspecified scope such as the EO 
authorizes could reach further.  Further, the EO does represent a more 
aggressive approach to antitrust policy than has been reflected in the 
recent past.  It is also a significant corrective for an anti-enforcement 
bias that has hampered antitrust policy for decades, that was never 
 
14EO, note __, at 36,987-88. 
15Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Black, j.), 
quoted in EO, supra note __ at 36989. 
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economically justified, and that continues to affect portions of the 
federal judiciary.16 
 
This paper briefly examines those portions of the Executive 
Order that are most immediately relevant to antitrust policy.  It does 
not discuss recommendations that are likely to be carried out through 
means unrelated to antitrust enforcement.17  To be sure, nearly any area 
of the economy may end up raising antitrust concerns, but that is 
largely because the antitrust laws are not limited to a specific sector.  
Their scope is nearly as broad as the scope of Congressional power to 
regulate commerce. Further, fact finding may uncover some antitrust 
violations. For example, high baggage handling fees, defense 
contracting prices, or beer distribution may all become antitrust 
violations if they involve collusion.  A number of provisions may or 
may not have antitrust consequences depending on what happens next, 
and future legislation could sweep in some of them. 
One of the reasons so many areas of concern covered by the 
EO do not immediately implicate the antitrust laws is its expression of 
a “whole of government” competition policy. This policy urges 
competitive solutions both through the antitrust laws and to other areas 
of law in which competitive concerns are prominent.18  One good 
 
16See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs (Working Paper June 2021), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3853282.  
17 Because the EO is far ranging, many of the things it discusses are likely to 
be addressed by means other than antitrust enforcement.  These include net 
neutrality and other broadband regulation, unfair data collection and 
surveillance, control over aviation and baggage fees, bottlenecks in public 
transportation, plant and seed protection through the patent system, wine and 
beer distribution, pricing and distribution of hearing aids, transparency in 
hospital and medical services pricing, prescription drug pricing both in the 
general insurance markets and via programs such as Medicare, defense 
contracting, issues relating to consumer mobility among financial 
institutions, and competitive development of nascent technologies such as 
pilot-less drones. 
18 Id. at 36,989, the EO expressly refers to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (Public Law 74-401, 49 Stat. 977, 
27 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), the Bank Merger Act, the Drug Price Competition and 
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result of a Presidentially supported “whole of government” approach 
to competition policy is more attention given to competition concerns 
by the relevant agencies and federal judges when they are applying 
bodies of law other than antitrust.19  This can cut both ways.  On the 
one hand it can increase attentiveness to competition issues in non-
antitrust enforcement.  On the other hand, it can also yield more 
regulation in situations where the uncontrolled market is viewed as 
failing because it is unreasonably restrictive or biased. 
One example of this is the EO’s strong commitment to net 
neutrality, or the imposition of common-carrier-like nondiscrimination 
rules on the suppliers of internet services.20  These are stated in a 
section of the EO addressed to the Chair of the FCC entitled “To 
promote competition, lower prices, and a vibrant and innovative 
telecommunications ecosystem.”21  The EO expresses similar concerns 
that communications spectrum auctions be organized in ways that 
distribute purchasers widely and evenly, preventing hoarding, or 
creating entry barriers. 
While this approach of declaring greater amounts of regulation 
to be “competitive” might seem odd today, it is strictly consistent with 
the neoclassical approach to regulation: permit markets to do their job 
when they can, but use regulation that corrects market failures with a 
 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585), the 
Shipping Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-237, 98 Stat. 67, 46 U.S.C. 40101 et 
seq.), the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-88, 109 Stat. 803), 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Fairness to Contact Lens 
Consumers Act (Public Law 108-164, 117 Stat. 2024, 15 U.S.C. 7601 et 
seq.), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376) (Dodd-Frank Act). 
19 Cf. Tom Christensen & Per Laegreid, The Whole-of-Government Approach 
to Public Sector Reform, 67 Public Administration Review 1059 (2007). 
20 As expressed during the Obama Administration by FCC, Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet, 80 FR 19738-01, 2015 WL 1605986(F.R.) 
(Apr. 12, 2015) 
21EO, note _, at 36,994. 
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goal of emulating competition as closely as possible.22  On the other 
hand, it is absolutely inconsistent with a theory of regulation widely 
shared by neoliberals since the 1970s that regulation is little more than 
the purchase of economic access or exclusion by interest groups.23  The 
EO at least implicitly recognizes that the neoclassical theory is almost 
always better, but only if the government is capable of sticking to it 
without playing favorites or letting politics intervene. 
Monopoly in the American Economy 
 The EO correctly describes the state of competition in the 
American economy as declining but does so in terms of 
“consolidation” and “excessive market concentration.”24  Today the 
level of concentration in American markets is hotly disputed.  Much 
of the uncertainty results from the types of data that are used to define 
markets.  Because “concentration” refers to the number of firms in a 
market, it is essential that markets be defined accurately.  The most 
widely used data for this purpose, which are from the U.S. census, 
offer incredibly poor correlations with higher concentration in 
properly defined markets.25  To say that the data are “useless” might 
be an exaggeration, but not by much. 
 There are better ways of assessing the amount of market power 
in the economy – namely, by direct measurement of price-cost 
margins.  In a competitive economy overall prices should be 
reasonably close to marginal costs, with some adjustments for 
 
22On the neoclassical approach to regulation, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455 (2019).  The 
classic treatment is ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (2 vols 2d ed. 1988). 
23As in George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6 (1971) (never discussing natural monopoly, high 
fixed costs, bottlenecks or other economic indicia of market failure, but only 
the purchase of exclusive rights from government officials). 
24 EO, note __ at 36,987 
25 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 
714, 726 (2018); Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, 
Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018) 
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innovation and other fixed costs.  Monopoly power is measured 
directly in terms of high price-cost margins.26  The measurement tools 
that we have today for direct measurement of price cost margins are 
much more accurate and relevant to the task than concentration 
numbers driven by census data.27  For example, these approaches do 
not need to worry about such things as whether markets are national, 
regional, or local, or variations in the correlation between structure and 
power.  That is, direct measurement enables us to estimate the extent 
of monopoly without the need to define a market. 
The EO does not mention margins or direct measurement.  
Nevertheless, the story at least at the general level is quite consistent 
with the account given in the EO:  Price-cost margins have been rising, 
particularly since the 1980s. These new approaches also permit 
something that concentration data do not, and that is determine where 
the increased returns are going.  While the returns to capital have 
increased significantly, the share of  returns that goes to labor has been 
seriously in decline, particularly among the less well trained portion of 
the labor market.28 
 
26William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, Ch. 3 (6th ed. 2020). 
27 Good recent examples are Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, 
The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q. J. 
ECON. 561 (2020) (seeing dramatic rise in margins since 1980); Robert E. 
Hall, Using Empirical Marginal Cost to Measure Market Power in the U.S. 
Economy (NBER Working Paper 2018), available at 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25251.  See id. at 18 (finding “substantial 
growth in market power” over the period from 1988 to 2015, although less 
than some others); Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout, and Simon Mongey, 
Quantifying Market Power and Business Dynamism in the Macroeconomy 
(CEPR Discussion Paper, May, 2021), available at 
https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP16097.pdf; David Autor, et al, 
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (NBER Working 
Paper May 2017), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w23396. 
28See Autor, supra; Matthias Kehrig and Nicolaw Vincent, The Micro-Level 
Anatomy of the Labor Share Decline, 136 Q.J. ECON. 1031 (2021) (also 
showing significant decline at the macro level, but instability at the firm 
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Although antitrust policy did become significantly less 
aggressive in the 1980s and following, this cannot be more than partly 
to blame for these declines in performance.  They are also attributable 
to generally hostile attitudes toward organized labor and lack of 
concern about labor mobility and education. In sum, these newer 
methodologies for measuring monopoly provide support for several 
initiatives in the President’s EO, including those addressing the decline 
in labor competition.  Just as we need more aggressive antitrust 
enforcement in some areas, we also need more aggressive support for 
labor, and for education and the other institutions that support it. 
“New Industries and Technologies” 
 The EO refers to the “challenges posed by new industries and 
technologies,” which include the “dominant internet platforms.”29  
That is a good and positive way of expressing the issue.  The giant 
platforms that have been in the crosshairs in Congress and other areas 
of public debate (mainly Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google) are 
new industries and technologies. They are not fundamentally a menace 
to society, although they certainly do raise competitive concerns.  They 
have been a principal contributor to economic growth, and the higher 
output that they facilitate benefits both consumers and labor as well as 
other businesses that interact with them.30 
The reason that the big platforms are so successful, of course, 
is that consumers like them.  It takes a special measure of arrogance 
and in any event would be political suicide to ignore consumer 
behavior.  Nevertheless, metered antitrust relief is appropriate, and that 
 
level).  For an attempt to link rising corporate returns and declining labor 
share to Chicago School antitrust policy, see Erdogan Bakir, Megan Hays, & 
Janet Knoedler, Rising Corporate Power and Declining Labor Share in the 
Era of Chicago School Antitrust, 55 J. ECON. ISSUES 397 (2021).  See also 
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor 
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2019). 
29 EO, note __, at 36,988 
30 See Joshua P. Zoffer, Short-Termism and Antitrust’s Innovation Paradox, 
71 Stan. L. Rev. Online 308 (2019). 
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is where the litigation-driven, fact-intensive approach that antitrust 
offers is valuable.  Further, the focus should be on remedies that tend 
toward higher output, increased consumer satisfaction, and more 
opportunities for labor and other input suppliers. 
The relationship between a dominant platform such as Amazon 
and the numerous small businesses who are affected by it is very 
complex and cannot be captured in a single sentence.  Amazon as well 
as other large internet firms have clearly injured many small 
businesses forced to compete with them.  On the other hand, Amazon 
has also supplied distribution services to many small businesses, who 
are able to reach broader markets as a result.31  While there are some 
vague similarities with the “chain stores” that were the targets of Louis 
Brandeis’ wrath a century ago, there are also important differences.32  
The war between family-owned single stores and large multistore 
operators such as Macy’s, Woolworth’s, the Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Company (“A&P”), and Sears was far more devastating to small 
business than the one between online sellers such as Amazon and 
smaller retailers. For example, A&P simply competed by selling its 
own products in competition with family owned grocers, who had no 
choice but to compete.33  By contrast, Amazon often becomes their 
 
31 See, e.g., Brock Blake, Amazon: Small Business Friend or Foe?, Forbes 
(Sep. 23, 2019, 10:23 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brockblake/2019/09/23/amazon-friend-or-
foe/?sh=27f171057367. 
32For a balanced evaluation of the issues, including Brandeis’ involvement, 
see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store movement, Localist 
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1011 (2005).  On the “fair trade” movement to impose resale 
price maintenance on discounters, see LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN 
FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE ‘NEW 
COMPETITION,’ 1890-1940 (2017). 
33See FRED ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
ACT 11-23 (1962) (large number of small grocers bankrupted by A&P led to 
passage of Robinson-Patman Act); Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: 
A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1119-1124 (1983); 
JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION (1955) 
(similar, but more detailed) 
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internet broker, enabling many small businesses to find markets that 
they could not otherwise reach.34 Others have been pressured into 
expanding their own online presence on other platforms.  That is, for 
many small businesses the story has been repositioning and reaching 
out rather than bankruptcy. 
In any event, the Brandeisian war against the chain stores 
utterly failed.  Demographics are hard things to resist, and the Brandeis 
movement for widespread use of resale price maintenance (“fair 
trade”) and discriminatorily high taxes on multi-store owners35 has 
given way to a consumer culture that has few qualms about shopping 
at large retailers. More importantly, and particularly for Democrats, a 
policy of forcing higher costs on larger retailers in order to protect 
smaller ones hurts low income people the most.36  The enemy is high 
prices and inadequate access to low cost alternatives, not size.  A 
policy of expanding broadband access into low income populations is 
almost certain to have a much bigger welfare payoff than one of 
disciplining online retailers simply because they are big. 
Anticompetitive practices that reduce output and raise prices 
are another matter.  It seems clear that anticompetitive things are 
happening and large e-retailers such as Amazon could be performing 
more competitively than they are.  One important thing for the FTC to 
 
34 See https://www.feedbackexpress.com/amazon-1029528-new-sellers-
year-plus-stats/ (last visited May 4, 2021) (noting that roughly five million 
firms sell their products on Amazon) 
35See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (striking down 
progressive tax on chain stores whose rate increased with the number of 
stores, over a dissent by Brandeis).  J.C. Penney, F.W. Woolworth Co., 
Montgomery Ward & Co. A&P, Kinney Shoes, United Cigar Stores and 
other retail chains were listed among the affected stores.  See Louis K. 
Liggett Co. v. Amox, 104 Fla.609, 141 So.153 (1932), rev’d, Liggett v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 517 (1933).  
36 See Ethan Kay & Woody Lewenstein, The Problem with the Poverty 
Premium, Harvard Business Review (Apr. 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-problem-with-the-poverty-premium (noting that 
low-income people pay much higher prices for most things than middle-class 
consumers do in the absence of large corporations offering low prices) 
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do is to study large online sellers and sort out the good from the bad.  
These conclusions will strongly affect the remedy.  Overly aggressive 
remedies applied with too little thought could injure large numbers of 
consumers who benefit from low prices and wide access.  Any remedy 
that reduces output will also injure labor as well as other suppliers.  
Particularly at the lower, or hourly wage, end of the labor spectrum, 
employment opportunities and wages are closely linked to product 
market output.37 
The Biden EO does not mention any of the dominant digital 
platforms by name, does not weigh in on the question whether they 
have substantial market power, and does not call for breakups.  While 
it does not accuse any particular platform of an anticompetitive 
practice, it does list several practices that should be investigated and 
pursued – namely “serial mergers, the acquisition of nascent 
competitors, the aggregation of data, unfair competition in attention 
markets, the surveillance of users, and the presence of network 
effects.”38  The inclusion of network effects is a mystery, as if they 
were inherently a bad thing.  The dramatic growth of networks since 
the second half of the twentieth century has produced extraordinary 
economic growth and benefitted nearly everyone, although some more 
than others.39  The task is not to get rid of them, which we could not 
do without reversing the telecommunications and internet revolution.  
Rather, government policy including antitrust should try to ensure that 
networked markets operate competitively and as openly as realistically 
possible. 
The EO also makes a point of stating that nothing in the 
relevant portions of the EO should “be construed to suggest that the 
statutory standard … should be displaced or substituted by the 
 
37 See S. Nickell et. al, Wages and Product Market Power, 61 Economica 457 
(1994). 
38EO, note __, at 36,988. 
39 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
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judgment of the Attorney general or the Chair of the FTC.”40  While 
that statement is of course true as a matter of law, the EO seems intent 
on confirming that the document should not be read as a license on the 
part of the antitrust enforcement agencies to go beyond existing law, 
at least not until such times as additional laws might be passed.   Later, 
the EO encourages the heads of these two agencies “to enforce the 
antitrust laws fairly and vigorously.”41 
“Unfair Competition in Major Internet Marketplaces” 
 While nothing in the EO suggests aggressive structural 
remedies against the large internet markets, it clearly supports 
expanded enforcement against anticompetitive practices.  This is one 
area where the FTC could do much good. “Major internet 
marketplaces” presumably refers to large internet sellers (which the 
EO does not name).  Amazon is certainly a target, although there are 
others. 
The idea of unfair competition, which implicitly invokes §5 of 
the FTC Act,42 has provoked controversy with respect to sellers who 
simultaneously sell their own products in competition with those of 
third parties.  The complaints range from antitrust claims that Amazon 
imposes anticompetitive most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses on its 
third-party merchants, that it steals information from its own third-
party vendors and uses it to make look-alike copies, and other claims 
akin to exclusive dealing or tying.  MFN’s, which are already subject 
to state AG and private litigation against Amazon,43 are clauses that 
 
40EO, note __, at 36,990 
41EO, note __, at 36,991. 
4215 U.S.C. §45 (“unfair methods of competition … are hereby declared 
unlawful”). 
43Cplt, D.C. v. Amazon (Superior Ct, Dist. D.C. May 25, 2021 (D.C. antitrust 
law), at https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/Amazon-Complaint-
.pdf.  See D.C. Accuses Amazon of Controlling Online Prices, New York 
Times (May 25, 2021), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/business/amazon-dc-lawsuit.html.  In 
addition, a class of purchasers has filed a lawsuit challenging MFNs in e-
14 Hovenkamp, Executive Order on Competition July, 2021 
 
require Amazon’s third party suppliers to provide Amazon with terms 
that are at least as favorable as those supplied to others, or that 
prohibits them from dealing with firms who charge less than Amazon 
charges.44  Some of these provisions have been withdrawn, possibly in 
contemplation of antitrust litigation.45  But there may be others, and 
even withdrawn policies can be subject to an injunction to prevent 
them from recurring.  These are matters for fact finding and litigation 
or rule making. 
In any event, judicially created legal standards should become 
more accommodating of enforcement.  Under current law vertical 
MFNs are presumably unlawful under the Sherman Act only if the 
defendant has a market share in excess of 30%-40%.  MFNs are not 
unlawful per se because under the right circumstances they can serve 
competitive ends.  For example, a competitive dealer invited to bid on 
a project may be more willing to bid if it has assurance that others are 
not being offered a better deal, with the result that its own offerings 
would not be competitive.  But the 30%-40% market share requirement 
will knock out most claims against Amazon, because there are not that 
many products for which its shares are that large.  E-books could be 
an exception, depending on how the market is defined.46 
Apropos of that, a better way to think about the MFN problem 
is to focus less on the total market share covered by the arrangement, 
 
books under federal antitrust law.  Fremgen v. Amazon, No. 1:21-cv-00351-
GHW-DCF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021), available at 
https://www.hbsslaw.com/sites/default/files/case-downloads/amazon-
ebooks-price-fixing/02-04-21-amended-complaint.pdf.  
44See Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement 
Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176 (2018).  
45 See, e.g, “Amazon Eases Price Restrictions on Third-Party Vendors, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, March 11, 2019), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/3beea4a6-445b-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3.  
46Amazon’s share of the e-book market is roughly 67%., but e-books make 
up only about 21% of total book sales.  That could give Amazon a market 
share of 67% if the relevant market is e-books, but more like 13% if its books 
generally.  For 2021 data, see https://about.ebooks.com/ebook-industry-
news-feed/.  
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but instead consider the role of marginal and less marginal distributors.  
A large firm need not control a large share of a market if its own outlets 
are more desirable than those of others.  In that case it may be able to 
impose higher costs on rival sellers simply because small producers 
need its business.47 What needs to happen is adjudication or rule 
making that is based on good economic evidence, and that then 
addresses these practices and enjoins them without undermining the 
overall benefits of the defendant’s distribution system.  If the story 
about Amazon’s MFNs is as reported and they are still in force, 
enjoining them could lead to higher output and reduced prices across 
the covered market.  This is an area where FTC input, perhaps by rule-
making, could be beneficial. The FTC could also quite reasonably use 
its own economic expertise to investigate the effects of MFNs under 
§5 and come up with a more aggressive rule than the Sherman Act 
currently employs. 
The same thing is true of Amazon’s allegedly discriminatory 
practices as between its own products and the products that it sells as 
a broker or reseller for other firms on the same website.  The 
commingled selling of one’s own products with the products of third 
parties is a good thing, even for a dominant firm.  Aggregate output 
increases if retail stores or platforms offer a variety of alternatives.  
Dual distribution of one’s own and competitor’s brands is a well-
established practice, and it increases consumer choice by forcing firms 
to compete with each other even within a particular store or website.48  
For example, someone looking for an e-reader on Amazon will find 
 
47See Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Control, NYU L. REV. ONLINE (2021) 
(forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793733.  The issue is 
explored further in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶570 (5th ed. 2021). 
48See, e.g., Peter J. Boyle & E. Scott Lathrop, The Value of Private label 
Brands to U.S. Consumers: An objective and Subjective Assessment, 20 J. 
RETAILING AND CONSUMER SERVICES 80 (2013); Rajeev Batra & Indrajit 
Sinha, Consumer-Level Factors Moderating the Success of Private label 
Brands, 76 J. RETAILING 175 (2000). 
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Amazon’s own Kindle products, Apple iPads, Barnes & Noble’s 
Nook, Sony, and some others.  Amazon’s use of its own brands 
resembles the widespread use of house brands by grocery chains, who 
often sell one or more house brands in competition with national 
brands, which are typically more heavily advertised.  Initially many 
customers believed that house brands were inferior, but that perception 
has changed significantly.49 
In the case of Amazon there are also concerns that Amazon 
uses nonpublic data collected from sales of third-party brands to design 
and engineer competing brands, or that it discriminates against third 
party sellers in its Buy Box, which selects default alternatives among  
sellers of the same product.50  Critics, such as Elizabeth Warren during 
her campaign for President, choose examples from among the large 
number of very small merchants who sell on the Amazon website.51  
Amazon has in the past made copies of merchandise that it sells for 
some firms and then markets variations under its own brand.52  Others 
point to sales, which occur when Amazon enters with its own brand 
against large manufacturers.  For example, Duracell is owned by 
Berkshire-Hathaway, a very large company.  It sells alkaline 
household batteries on the Amazon website in competition with 
Amazon’s own AmazonBasics house brand.  Here the effect seems 
 
49See Stephen J. Hoch, How Should National Brands Think about Private 
Labels, 37 SLOAN MGM’T REV. 89 (1996). 
50Selection of products for the Buy Box has produced some non-antitrust 
litigation. See Kangaroo Mfr., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 1280945 
(D.Az. March 20, 2019) (partially sustaining claims based on tortious 
interference, unfair competition, and trademark infringement).  For good 
introductions to the Buy Box, see Nikolas Guggenberger, Essential 
Platforms, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 237 (2021); Ben Bloodstein, Amazon and 
Platform Antitrust, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 187 (2019). 
51See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 
B.U. L. REV. 489, 540-542 (2021). 
52 See Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped Up Data from Its Own Sellers to 
Launch Competing Products, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:51 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-
sellers-to-launch-competing-products-11587650015. 
2021 Antitrust and Executive Order 17 
 
clear: the presence of the Amazon brand forces Duracell to cuts its own 
price if it wants to make more sales.53  That kind of competition 
between “house brands” and “name brands” brings higher output, 
lower prices for consumers, and a higher degree of choice. These 
things need to be investigated empirically and dispassionately, with an 
eye toward the possibility of conduct that violates the antitrust laws or 
perhaps intellectual property laws.  When such conduct is discovered, 
the most effective and least disruptive remedy is most often an 
injunction that forces it to stop.54 
Eliminating Amazon’s right to sell its own house brand 
batteries in competition with Duracell will not solve any problem 
worth solving.  It will force higher prices by eliminating an important 
arena of low-switching-cost competition. To the extent the higher 
prices reduce output it will also harm labor and other input suppliers.  
It will of course benefit Berkshire Hathaway by freeing it from an 
aggressive competitor, but that would not be something to crow about.  
More fundamentally it would run counter to the entire thrust of this EO 
as well as President Biden’s economic policy generally, which is to 
strengthen economic growth by bringing more output, more 
competition, lower prices, and broader choice to consumers.  
Antitrust’s role in promoting economic growth is surely limited, but it 
should not operate as an affirmative obstacle. 
Mergers 
 Merger policy in the United States is currently enforced by the 
two antitrust enforcement Agencies acting mainly under Guidelines 
 
53 See Julie Creswell, How Amazon Steers Shoppers to Its Own Products, The 
New York Times (June 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/business/amazon-the-brand-
buster.html. 
54See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 
1952, 2016 (2021). 
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issued in 2010 for horizontal mergers55 and 2020 for vertical 
mergers.56  There are no current Guidelines for “conglomerate” 
mergers, which are mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical.  In 
addition, the entire thrust of the current Guidelines is against mergers 
that enable the parties to charge higher prices, whether it be the two 
parties to the merger or the entire market in which the merger occurs. 
Mergers are not addressed in the Guidelines as exclusionary 
practices, and that has turned out to be an important oversight.  Many 
acquisitions of smaller firms by large tech platforms are very likely 
intended to prevent the emergence of these small firms as new 
competitors.57 A July 2021 article in the Wall Street Journal observed 
that one feature of U.S. antitrust law has been its traditional reliance 
on the rise of upstarts to discipline monopoly – but that reliance is 
unjustified in an environment in which most of the promising upstarts 
are acquired by their potential rivals.58  The FTC explicitly alleged in 
its Facebook complaint59 that the reason FB acquired Instagram was 
because it feared Instagram’s emergence as a viable competitor to 
Facebook.  Significantly, the FTC’s challenge was under §2 of the 
Sherman Act and the judge dismissed the merger complaint without 
 
55U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 
2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-
guidelines-08192010.  




57See Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, 
and Antitrsut Policy, 87 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 221 (2020). 
58Daniel Michaels and Brent Kendall, U.S. Competition Policy is Aligning 
with Europe, and Deeper Cooperation Could Follow, WALL ST. JOURNAL, 
July 15, 2021). 
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prejudice for that reason, holding that the FTC had not made out the 
market power requirements for a §2 violation.60 
 New Guidelines should address these concerns with respect to 
all firms, including the platforms.  The concerns include both mergers 
that are neither horizontal nor vertical, and the use of mergers to 
prevent the emergence of new rivals.  Beyond that are other concerns.  
For example, several recent empirical studies indicate that prices have 
increased following close but approved mergers, indicating that the 
current thresholds are too lenient.61  One thing that would go a long 
way is to eliminate an anti-enforcement bias that too often inclines 
courts to understate the competitive threats, while exaggerating 
anticipated efficiencies.62 
Labor and Employee Non-Competition Agreements  
 The EO also recommends that the relevant enforcement 
agencies further policies intended to protect workers from agreements 
that suppress wages or worker mobility.63  This is a reference to 
agreements among employers to suppress wages or not to poach one 
another’s employees. These are already illegal per se under United 
States antitrust law and may be criminal offenses.64  The reference is 
not to agreements among employees to withhold their labor for a higher 
 
60FTC v. Facebook, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. 
June 28, 2021). 
61E.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015). 
62See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, 
Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
63 EO, note __, at 36,992. 
64See Department of Justice, Antitrust Dvision, “No-Poach Approach”, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-
2019/no-poach-approach. See also Indictment, United States of America v. 
Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC, No. 3-21CR0011-L (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021), 
ECF No. 1 (naked market division among competitors agreeing not to hire 
one another’s senior level employees); Indictment, United States v. Davita, 
Inc., No. 21-cr-00229 (D. Colo. 2021), ECF No. 1 (competitors agreeing not 
to hire or solicit one another’s senior level employees) 
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wage.  Most such agreements are immune from the antitrust laws under 
§6 of the Sherman Act as well as several other provisions and a long 
case law recognizing a labor immunity from antitrust.65  The EO also 
urges the Attorney General and the FTC to consider revising the 
Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, which the 
Agencies issued jointly in October, 2016.66  Those guidelines already 
make clear that naked anti-poaching or wage fixing agreements are 
illegal per se, while similar agreement in bona fide joint ventures that 
involve shared employment are not.67  The current Guidelines also take 
the position that exchanges of information about wages or other terms 
of employment are not illegal per se.68  However, even an unaccepted 
invitation to engage in wage fixing can be unlawful under the FTC 
Act.69  Such unaccepted invitations generally do not violate §1 of the 
Sherman Act, which requires an “agreement” between the parties and 
does not contain an attempt offense.  Section 5 of the FTC Act contains 
no such limitations, however.  As a result, this is one of those areas 
where the FTC Act can reach further than the Sherman Act.70 
 The EO also urges the chair of the FTC to engage in 
rulemaking with respect the “unfair use of non-compete clauses” or 
other clauses limiting worker mobility.  Here the problems are 
significant.  Employee noncompete agreements are typically clauses 
contained in employment agreements that prohibit employees from 
moving to competitors for a defined period after job termination.  
Historically they were used mainly to protect firms whose employees 
possessed significant trade secrets or managerial know how, or else 
 
65See 15 U.S. C. §17.  On the scope of the labor immunity, see PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶255-257 (5th ed. 
2021). 
66Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals (Oct. 2016), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download. 
67 Id. at 2. 
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. at 7. 
70 See discussion supra, text at note __.  On unaccepted solicitations under 
the FTC Act, see 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶1419 (4th ed. 2018). 
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who had received substantial on-the-job training at their employers’ 
expense.71  In these cases, the fear was that hiring employers could free 
ride by stealing employees who possessed these things from their 
current employment.  Even under these limitations there was always a 
question about whether employee noncompetition covenants produced 
the social benefits that were claimed for them.  For example, studies 
examining technically trained employees in California, which forbids 
most employee noncompete covenants, and Massachusetts, which 
enforces them, tended to conclude that the California model actually 
facilitated economic development more than the Massachusetts model.  
Indeed, some studies even suggested that the reason Silicon Valley 
grew up in the Stanford, California, area rather than the 
Cambridge/MIT/Harvard area was California’s refusal to enforce 
agreements limiting employee mobility.72  Others dispute these 
results.73 
Even covenants that involve highly trained employees should 
be re-examined, and consideration given to less restrictive alternatives, 
 
71See Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-compete Agreements and the 
Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 Am. Socio. Rev. 695 
72 David P. Twomey, The Developing Law of Employee Non-Competition 
Agreements: Correcting Abuses: Making Adjustment fo Enhance Economic 
Growth, 50 NO. ATL. REG. BUS. L. ASSN. #87 (2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119986 (“Non-
compete agreements adversely impact job mobility, wage growth and new 
professional opportunities”); Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh, & Lee Fleming, 
Regional Disadvantage? Employee Noncopete Agreements and Brain Drain, 
44 RES. POL. 394 (2015) (“employee non-compete agreements encourage the 
migration of workers from states where such contracts are enforceable to 
states where they are not”); Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of 
Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 MGM’T 
SCI. 905 (1999) (worker mobility is most conducive to the flow of 
knowledge).  More qualified, but still finding a positive effect of California 
non-enforcement policy in the computer industry is Bruce Fallick, Charles 
A. Fleischman, & James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in Silcon Valley: Some 
Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 
88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006). 
73E.g., Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for Noncompetes, 
87 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 953 (2020). 
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including such things as direct enforcement for trade secret theft.  If 
the studies in the majority are correct, however, a strong rule against 
enforcing such covenants may not do much harm and could even do 
some good.  It does bear noting, however, that the bulk of 
noncompetition enforcement actions occur under state statutory and 
common law. 
 A relatively recent phenomenon concerning noncompetes is 
more disturbing because it involves employees who have not received 
a high degree of technical training or generally do not possess valuable 
trade secrets.  This current phenomenon is the widespread use of 
noncompetition agreements imposed on low wage workers in 
industries such as fast food service that have only minimum training.  
The covenants are hard to defend economically even on traditional 
grounds.  At this writing a few franchisors have terminated these 
agreements in the face of antitrust litigation.74  
 A complicating factor for antitrust policy is that these 
covenants are vertical agreements and typically in competitively 
structured product markets.  Many of those that are currently being 
litigated arise within single franchises.  For example DesLandes vs. 
McDonald’s was a challenge to noncompetition agreements that 
MacDonald’s placed in the franchise agreements of all of its 
franchisees, and that are drafted so as to prevent employees from 
moving from one MacDonald’s franchise location to another.75  While 
 
74See Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 2021 WL 718320 (S.D.Il. 
Feb. 24, 2021) (noting that Jimmy John’s comprehensive employee 
noncompete provision was terminated in 2018). 
75 Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D.Il. Jn. 25, 
2018) (partially sustaining complaint).  See also Arrington v. Burger King 
Worldwide, Inc., 448 F.Supp.3d 1322 (S.D.Fl. 2020), app. docketed (11th Cir. 
Sep. 23, 2020) (concluding that franchisor and franchisees were a single firm, 
so there was no concerted action; court noted that 50 out of 7226 restaurants 
were owned by BK; the rest were independently owned with franchise 
agreements); Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising, LLC, 2019 WL 
2247731 (E.D. Mi. May 24, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss on claim of a 
horizontal restraint).  For a straightforward evaluation, see Michael Ladevaia, 
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a horizontal agreement of this nature between competing restaurants 
would be unlawful per se,76 the MacDonald’s agreements are formally 
a set of vertical agreements between MacDonald’s as franchisor and 
each of its individual franchisees.  Under current antitrust law a purely 
vertical agreement of this nature must be governed by the rule of 
reason,77 and even a large fast food company such as MacDonald’s 
does not possess the 30% to 40% market share that the courts generally 
require for rule of reason illegality. 
The question whether these formally vertical noncompete 
agreements are actually horizontal and for the (anticompetitive) 
benefit of the competing franchisees can then be important.  
Sometimes the terms are a giveaway. For example, in declining to 
dismiss an antitrust complaint against a noncompete agreement 
imposed by the Jimmy John’s sandwich franchise in its franchisee 
agreements, the court noted a third-party beneficiary provision that 
permitted one Jimmy John’s franchisee to enforce the agreement with 
respect to a different franchisee.78 That strongly indicates that this 
particular set of noncompete agreements was in fact horizontal, for the 
benefit of the franchisees by enabling them to limit wage competition 
among themselves. 
The EO encourages the Chair of the FTC, in the Chair’s 
discretion, to work with the rest of the commission to engage in rule 
making “appropriate and consistent with applicable law” respecting 
“agreements that may unduly limit workers’ ability to change jobs.”79  
As noted previously,80 §5 of the FTC Act can be used against 
 
Poach-no-More: Antitrust Considerations for Intra-Franchise No-Poach 
Agreements, 38 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151 (2020). 
76 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
77NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (purely vertical 
exclusionary agreement to be addressed under rule of reason). 
78 Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F.Supp.3d 786, 793 (S.D.Ill. 
2018).  As noted in note __, Jimmy John’s subsequently withdrew its 
noncompete agreement. 
79 EO, supra note __ at 36,992. 
80 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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everything covered by the Sherman Act plus a penumbra of practices 
that may not fall within the letter of the Sherman Act but are within its 
spirit.81  In this case, rule making that applies a harsh rule against intra-
franchise noncompetes, even if not formally horizontal, seems well 
justified.  The agreements serve to limit the mobility of employees in 
a vulnerable, low wage sector and promise very little benefit in return 
– particularly, as in these cases, when they are applied more-or-less 
universally to all employees. 
Another limit on employee mobility is occupational licensing 
restrictions, which the EO mentions but does not cover in any detail.82  
This may be a reference to state-issued licenses thought to be too 
restrictive.  If so, that would almost certainly require preemptive 
federal legislation and would raise major disputes over federalism and 
the right of the states to license internal practitioners of various 
occupations.  Closely related but more easily reachable under the 
antitrust laws are “unauthorized practice” rules that are often 
promulgated by interested professional groups themselves.  Here 
federal antitrust policy has a role.  For example, in North Carolina 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,83 a divided (6-3) Supreme Court 
held that antitrust “state action” immunity did not apply when a state 
board controlled entirely by practicing dentists and not supervised by 
any public agency passed and enforced a rule prohibiting teeth 
whitening by non-dentists.84 
What is not clear from the statement is whether the President 
wishes to go further.  The “state action” doctrine, which has a long 
history,85 has always been a balancing act of federalism, as the dissent 
in the North Carolina Dental case makes clear.  Under it the states are 
free to engage in as much occupational licensing as they wish, 
 
81 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
82 EO, note __, at 36,992. 
83574 U.S. 494 (2015).  
84 On the “state action” doctrine, see PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶221-231 (5th ed. 2020). 
85Parker vs. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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provided that it is actually the state rather than private parties doing 
the regulating.  For example, if a state wished to license dog walkers 
it could do so, provided that it clearly stated its intent to do so via 
appropriate legislation or other action, and that any private decision 
making was adequately supervised by an independent government 
actor.  At that point, antitrust policy has nothing further to say and 
stands aside.  Going further might be Constitutionally possible, but it 
would require a different judgment about the division of federal and 
state regulatory power in an area that for most occupations was 
traditionally reserved to the states, with a few exceptions such as the 
granting of airplane pilots’ licenses.86  In any event, federal intrusion 
more deeply into state control of the professions is not likely to be 
something that the antitrust enforcement agencies can accomplish on 
their own, and Congress may not even think it desirable. 
Patents, Standard Essential Patents, and Practices Involving 
Anticompetitive Patent Agreements 
One place that a “whole of government” approach to 
competition policy could go even further than the EO pushes it is 
patents. Patent law has often taken the exclusionary privilege 
conferred by patents to extremes, often writing as if competition were 
the enemy to be conquered rather than a body of law that should be 
made to work in tandem with antitrust law.87  This level of disdain for 
antitrust policy is in sharp conflict with the fact that the impact of 
competition policy is much easier to assess than is the impact of patent 
policy.  As a general matter, patent protection operates as a severe 
exception to the free movement of resources and ideas, and its 
coverage should not extend further than the Patent Act expressly 
 
86https://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/.  
87E.g., Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014).  See Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive 
Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871 (2016). 
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authorizes.  Beginning with that premise enforcement authorities can 
do much good.88 
In what can only be regarded a serious understatement, the EO 
asks the Attorney General and the Secretary of Commerce to 
reconsider the position taken on standard-essential patents and 
FRAND commitments.89  Consistent with that policy statement the 
Antitrust Division parted ways with the FTC and intervened against it 
in an important case involving exclusionary practices in the market for 
standard essential patents.90  The Ninth Circuit’s decision, which 
reversed a well-reasoned and well-supported decision in the Northern 
District of California,91 did very considerable damage to the usefulness 
of antitrust to police anticompetitive practices in FRAND patent 
licensing.  For its part, the Policy Statement that is now put into 
question, was inconsistent with well-established law on the entitlement 
to an injunction.92 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens to undermine highly 
successful, voluntary arrangements for technology sharing in areas 
 
88See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A 
Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467 (2015). 
89 Referring to “Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments,” issued jointly by the 
Department of Justice, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology on December 19, 2019, 
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1228016/. The FTC did not 
join. The term “FRAND” refers to “Fair Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory” royalties.  Sometimes the F is dropped to “Rand,” yielding 
the EO’s usage of F/RAND.  EO, supra note 36,991. 
90FTC v. Qualcomm, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
91FTC v. Qualcomm Corp., 411 F.Supp.3d 658 (N.D.Cal. 2019). 
92Criticized in Herbert Hovenkamp, Justice Department’s New Position on 
Patents, Standard Setting, and Injunctions (Reg Rev. Jan. 6, 2020) available 
at https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/06/hovenkamp-justice-
department-new-position-patents-standard-setting-injunctions/. On the 
legacy of the Trump-Era position, which is apparently already on the outs in 
the Antitrust Division, see Foss Patents (April 16, 2021), at 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2021/04/doj-downgrades-delrahim-letter-to-
ieee.html.  
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such as cellular phones and autonomous vehicles that produce 
enormous social benefits but are also quite vulnerable to manipulation, 
particularly by larger participants.93  Of course, one cannot be sure that 
the same thing would not have happened if the Antitrust Division had 
not “switched sides” and decided to speak in behalf of a FRAND 
violator rather than the FTC.  Further, care must still be taken not to 
breach the line between contract and antitrust.  FRAND agreements 
are fundamentally contractual and not every breach of contract violates 
the antitrust laws.  But neither is contract law a defense, and in the 
Qualcomm case the record of Qualcomm’s antitrust violations seemed 
clear enough.94 
One important thing to understand about FRAND is its 
inherently private, contractual nature, as well as its ability to pull large 
numbers of developers into a competitive but networked 
infrastructure.  This makes it an engine of truly incredible economic 
growth in networked high tech markets.  It enables both private 
cooperation and competition in technology development. 
Nevertheless, destabilizing temptations such as those that 
befell Qualcomm are a serious threat.  Declaring a patent to be 
“standard essential,” which is a prerequisite to placing it within the 
FRAND system, makes it worth far more because standard essential 
patents can be adopted by other firms without worry that they will later 
be surprised by infringement actions after they have made a significant 
investment in technology that writes on that standard.95  The FRAND 
system addresses this with an important tradeoff: FRAND patents will 
get adopted into the standard, but with important limitations on the 
power to exclude that patent law would otherwise grant.  First, the 
FRAND system imposes component level (rather than final product) 
 
93Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORN. L. REV. 1683 
(2020). 
94Id. at 1700-1728. 
95See Aminta Raffalovich & Steven Schwartz, Antitrust Analysis of FRAND 
Licensing Post-FTC v. Qualcomm, 31 J. Antitrust & Unfair Competition L. 
(2021); Hovenkamp, FRAND, supra note __, at 1728-1734. 
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licensing based on the ex ante value of the patent prior to its FRAND 
declaration – i.e., at a time when it was still in competition with a 
broader range of alternatives.96  FRAND then also requires that such 
patents be licensed to all takers at FRAND rates, without regard to 
whether the putative licensee is a competitor.  
Qualcomm flaunted these rules by charging royalties higher 
than FRAND-determined rates, and selectively refusing to license to 
competitors, in violation of FRAND commitments.97 The evidence 
based on market power and exclusion was more than sufficient to 
support claims of antitrust violations.  This was a case that the FTC 
should not have lost.  Hopefully the FTC can write rules for FRAND 
that will indicate the types of conduct that will trigger FTC actions, 
and a new DOJ will cooperate.  Simple breaches of FRAND 
agreements are not enough, but when market power and exclusionary 
effects are present, as they clearly were in Qualcomm, antitrust 
intervention is appropriate.  That then leaves the issue to the federal 
courts, and many judges remain suspicious.  That gives the FTC a 
particularly high burden to justify and clarify its position. 
The EO also unfortunately states its concerns about patent 
abuses too narrowly by seeking to “avoid the potential for 
anticompetitive extension of market power beyond the scope of 
granted patents….”98  That is certainly a problem, but by relying on 
this ancient “beyond the scope”99 formulation the EO overlooks the 
potential for anticompetitive abuse that can arise within the scope of a 
patent.  Pay-for-delay itself is an example.  The question in a pay-for-
delay case is not whether the conduct – a settlement of patent 
 
96 See Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential Patents, 
19 COL. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79 (2017). 
97 Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 983-86. 
98 EO, supra note __, at 36,991. 
99E.g., Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 576 (1895) (the courts have no right to 
enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim…).  
 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 
52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515 (2015). 
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infringement litigation – lies outside the scope of the patent.  Rather, 
the practice results from serious doubts that the patent itself is any 
good to begin with.  For that reason, it was the anti-enforcement 
dissenters in Actavis who argued in favor of the “scope of the patent” 
test.100  In most of the cases that condemned anticompetitive conduct 
for being “beyond the scope” of the patent, the patent itself was 
presumed to be valid.  Rather, the defendant was asserting some kind 
of right to exclude, such as the tying of unpatented goods that the 
patent did not protect.101 
The same thing is true of anticompetitive patent acquisitions 
and much of the activities of patent assertion entities (PAEs) in 
acquiring and aggregating large numbers of patents from outside 
inventors.  In most of these cases the problem is not that the defendant 
is acting beyond the scope of the patent, but that the patents themselves 
are either invalid or the activities, such as post-issuance acquisitions, 
are not protected by the patent act at all.102  For these, stronger 
guidance from the FTC would be a good idea. 
Aggregations of issued patents by non-practicing entities who 
bring them simply to file infringement suits actually has a remedy in 
existing law.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act,103 the merger provision, 
 
100FTC v. Actavis Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 162, 167 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (under the “scope of the patent” test the pay for delay settlement 
would not violate the antitrust laws).  See also Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2021) (a recent FTC 
victory in a pay-for-delay case) (not mentioning scope of the patent test). 
101E.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
517 (1917) (tying of patented film projector to unpatented films was attempt 
to create a monopoly “wholly without the scope of the patent….”) 
102See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 280 
F.Supp.3d 691 (D.Md. 2017) (defendant’s practice of buying up all patents 
by outside inventors relating to an area of technology and then using them to 
extract royalties from unknowing infringers not unlawful where at least some 
of the patents were valid; further, observing that the enforcement fell within 
the scope of the patents). 
103 15 U.S.C. §18. 
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prohibits assets as well as stock acquisitions, and a patent is clearly an 
“asset” for this purpose.104  While patents are transferable assets, 
patent acquisitions can become unlawful mergers when they threaten 
competition, and patent validity is not a defense.105  While a patent 
itself creates a right to exclude it does not create the right to create a 
monopoly after the patent has been issued.  This is a simple principle 
that derives from the difference between a property right and an 
economic monopoly.  For example, ownership of a factory gives its 
owner the power to exclude trespassers, but that does not protect the 
parties when the sale of the factory becomes an unlawful merger.  
 The EO invites the FTC to engage in rule-making with respect 
to pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlements.106  In its Actavis decision 
in 2013 the Supreme Court held that pay-for-delay pharmaceutical 
settlements are reachable under the antitrust laws.107  Briefly, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act grants a 180-day period of exclusivity, kind of a 
short second patent, to the first generic to come into the market upon 
the expiration of a primary patent in a particular drug.108  This system 
has become heavily gamed.  While initial drug patents, particularly 
those on molecules, are usually very strong, the drug companies have 
developed a variety of ways to patent lookalike products that serve the 
same market need as the pioneer drug.  These patents, in contrast to 
the pioneer patents, are notoriously weak and have a high invalidity 
rate. 
The simplest variation of the pay-for-delay practice is that a 
generic drug maker files its intent to enter the market when the primary 
patent expires.  The owner of that patent then files an infringement suit 
 
104See 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶1202f (5th ed. 2021) (forthcoming). 
105 See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Buying Monopoly: Antitrust 
Limits on Damages for Externally Acquired Patents, 25 TEX. INTEL. PROP. 
L.J. 39 (2017). 
106 EO, supra note __, 36,997. 
107 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
108 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
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on the weak follow-on patent – a suit that the patentee would be likely 
to lose on grounds of invalidity.  At that time, however, the pioneer 
patentee pays the generic a very large sum, often in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, to delay its entry for several years.  Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act no other generic can enter during that time either.  
The effect of this “reverse payment” settlement – that is from the 
patentee to the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around – is 
to extend the primary drug’s period of exclusivity, often for several 
years.  The more important result is that the settlement serves to 
preserve the drug’s price at the high level it obtained during the period 
of the pioneer patent.109 This was one of those cases where the 
dissenters gave voice to a “consumer welfare” standard for antitrust 
while approving a practice that unambiguously increased consumer 
prices, often by hundreds of millions of dollars.110 
 Justice Breyer’s Actavis’ opinion for the majority found a basis 
for illegality but also held that, given offsetting considerations due to 
the patents, the rule of reason should be applied.111  That meant that 
the practice entered the rule-of-reason labyrinth which under current 
law is subject to a severe anti-enforcement bias.  The result is very 
costly litigation.  On top of that causation and damages requirements 
are heroic, making it exceedingly difficult for private plaintiffs to win 
cases. 
 A better approach would be a much harsher substantive rule – 
close to per se illegality, but with allowance for reasonably anticipated 
litigation costs (roughly $5 million).112  A patentee still has a right to 
 
109 See Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill Herbert Hovenkamp, & Carl Shapiro, 
The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 
(2015).  
110FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, 
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas). 
111Id. at 159. 
112See Jongsub Lee, Seungjoon Oh, & Paula Suh, Inter-Firm Patent 
Litigation and Innovation Competition (SSRN working paper, 2021), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298557 
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defend a patent reasonably believed to be valid, and also to settle rather 
than confront the cost and uncertainties of litigation. When reverse 
payment settlemets in the Hatch-Waxman setting reach into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, however, it is pretty clear that the 
parties are not disputing over a patent presumed to be valid.  Rather 
they are gaming the system so as to divide rents from a practice that 
uses that Act precisely in the opposite way from intended, which was 
to facilitate the prompt entry of generic drugs.113 
 Finally, the EO contains statements directed mainly to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services addressing practices that 
unreasonably delay the competitive introduction and production of 
biosimilar drugs, as well as outside producer access to drug products 
for purposes of litigation.114 A biosimilar drug is a distinguishable 
compound from the original, but that one that has no clinically 
meaningful differences in terms of safety and effectiveness.115 One 
particularly pernicious abuse of the patent process is a pioneer drug 
maker’s acquisitions of patents on similar drugs to its own products.  
The firm does not practice these patents, but holds them to make sure 
that no outside firm can innovate a similar competitor.116  At present 
there is a small amount of antitrust litigation involving firms who delay 
the entry of biosimilars by acquiring the relevant patent 
 
(median of all patent litigation through trial; could be larger for valuable 
patents) 
113See Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law and Patent Settlement Design, 32 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 417 (2019) (stating the relevant conditions for such 
rules). 
114 EO, note __, at 36,997. 
115See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust 
Frontier, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
116See Gregory R. Day & W. Michael Schuster, Patent Inequality, 71 ALA. 
L. REV. 115, 130-121 (2019 ); see also Peter Loftus & Denise Roland, By 
Adding Patents, Drugmaker Keeps Cheaper Humira Copies Out of 
U.S., WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biosimilar-
humira-goes-on-sale-in-europe-widening-gap-with-u-s-
1539687603?ns=prod/accounts-wsj.  
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preemptively.117 Other claims are of anticompetitive bundled 
discounts that tie packages or cocktails of drugs together, effectively 
excluding a biosimilar competitor.118 There is also litigation, not 
exclusively under the antitrust laws, involving agreements with 
insurers that restrict payment for use of biosimilars.119 
 For much of patent/antitrust litigation the FTC has a distinctive 
advantage over private plaintiffs.  Acting as an enforcer, the FTC need 
not prove causation or damages, but only the violation itself.  A private 
plaintiff needs to prove both.120  This is particularly important in 
innovation intensive areas because the requirement that private 
plaintiffs prove causation and damages – both essential statutory 
features of private claims – require them to establish “but for” 
situations that are extremely difficult to establish in complex markets 




117 E.g., In re Humira Antitrust Litigation, 465 F.Supp.3d 811 (N.D.Il. 2020), 
app. docketed 7th Cir. July 30, 2020 (Noerr-Pennington doctrine precluded 
antitrust liability where roughly half of the patents that the defendant asserted 
were found to be valid).  Cf. Biocad JSC v. Hoffman-La Roche, 942 F.3d 88 
(2d Cir. 2019) (foreign manufacturers failed to show that their claim that 
defendant’s scheme to exclude biosimilar drugs fell within exclusion of the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §6a, given that in the 
first instance the injuries accrued entirely to foreign firms).  The problem of 
antitrust and new entry by biosimilars is treated in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER LESLIE AND MICHAEL 
CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRSUT: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 2017 & 2021 Supp.). 
118Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F.Supp.3d 494 (E.D.Pa. 2018) 
(denying motion to dismiss bundled discount claim). 
119In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., 345 F.Supp.3d 566 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 7, 2018).   
120 For a good examination, see Kevin B. Soter, Causation in Reverse 
Payment Antitrust Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (2018). 
121 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, __ WASH. UNIV. 
L. REV (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399.  
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Right to Repair 
The issue of right to repair one’s own durable equipment, or 
alternatively to choose one’s own repair technician, sounds somewhat 
removed from antitrust, and much of it is.  In fact, however, the right 
to select one’s own repair service was the subject of a controversial 
Supreme Court antitrust decision in 1992.122   The Court held that a 
nondominant firm’s restraints on third-party repairs of its photocopiers 
was actionable in at least some circumstances where the owner of the 
photocopier was “locked in” by virtue of its purchase and thus needed 
repair parts and service that were specific to that particular brand.  
After remand, the plaintiffs won a significant victory at trial.123  As a 
result a type of antitrust right to repair still has some vitality under the 
Sherman Act, particularly if the restraint imposed by the manufacturer 
can be characterized as a tying arrangement.124 
The right to repair can also raise issues under patent law – in 
particular, in patent law’s ancient distinction between “repair” and 
“reconstruction.”125  Under the Patent Act the purchaser/user of a 
patented good has a right to “repair” it but not to “reconstruct” it.  The 
Supreme Court has generally interpreted this law in a way that is 
favorable to users.  For example, in its fractured plurality decision in 
Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,126 the 
court held that an independent firm could lawfully replace the entire 
canvas top of a traditional “ragtop” convertible automobile, leaving 
only the metal supports as original.  As is so often the case, the patented 
good had parts that are either single-use or else that wear out more 
quickly than other parts.  Relying on that decision, the Federal Circuit 
 
122 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
123Largely affirmed by 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
124 The decision was widely criticized, including by this author.  See 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __ at §3.3a. 
125 See Natali Richter, “Substantial Embodiments” and “Readily replaceable 
Parts”: A Contemporary Understanding of the Doctrine of Permissible 
Repair, 59 UNIV. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 333 (2021) (summarizing many 
doctrine developments to date). 
126365 U.S. 336 (1961), subsequently qualified in 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
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held in Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC,127 that firms who completely 
refurbished disposable cameras that were intended for a single use 
were conducting a permissible “repair,” not a reconstruction.  This 
right by the purchaser to rebuild is also strongly reflected in the patent 
“exhaustion” doctrine, which holds that the purchase of a patented 
article exhausts all of the patentee rights in that article, leaving the 
owner free to repair it.  For example, once a printer maker sells a 
patented toner cartridge it cannot enforce by patent law a restriction 
prohibiting users from refilling it and replacing worn parts as 
needed.128  Patent exhaustion is not an antitrust doctrine, but it is often 
applied in such a way as to reach the same vertical practices that 
antitrust law reaches.129  
Looking only at products that are sold, the right of the 
purchaser to make her own repairs appears to be strongly embedded in 
American law.  Indeed, patent exhaustion doctrine stated as much 
since the beginning of the twentieth century,130 and even tilted toward 
expansive permission of repairs in the 1850s.131 
Two important variations can provoke serious problems, 
however.  One is when the aftermarket part is itself patented and the 
 
127264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
128Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017). 
129The practice is most frequently analogized to tying. See 10 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1782 (4th ed 2019). 
130Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150 (1st Cir. 1901) 
(finding permissible repair rather than reconstruction when purchasers of 
heavy duty sewing machines used for making shoes replaced the machines' 
worn out cams); Morrin v. Robert White Eng'g Works, 138 F. 68, 77 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905) (holding that part replacement constituted a repair 
rather than reconstruction when consumption of the replaced part is an 
essential element of the device). 
131Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850) (“repairing” permissible, but not 
“replacing”; here, purchaser of patented wood-planing machine had right to 
replace the blades, or cutters, which wore out frequently).  On the history 
prior to the Sherman Act, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design 
of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1155 (2018). 
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other is when essential diagnostic or repair tools include software, 
which is licensed rather than sold. 
Suppose a particular patented electronic part in a cellular phone 
fails and must be replaced.  Here, the Patent Act provides that a 
patentee has no duty to license a patent to someone else, and this entails 
that a manufacturer of the patented part has no duty to sell it.132  In that 
case, under current law the owner of the phone may be stuck: she can 
obtain the part only from the manufacturer/patentee, who may insist 
on installing it as well.  That could be a tie of parts and service, which 
under some circumstances could be unlawful under the antitrust 
laws.133 
A related variation occurs when the replacement part bears 
design features and the replacement part is covered by a design patent.  
This issue has arisen in the market for aftermarket “crash” parts for 
automobiles and could threaten the enterprise of making and selling 
non-OEM parts.  In Automotive Body Parts Assn. v. Ford Global Tech, 
LLC, the Federal Circuit held that an automobile manufacturer could 
lawfully enforce design patents on aftermarket parts such as 
bumpers.134  The result can prevent third parties from manufacturing 
replacement parts for automobiles – or practically anything else – if 
the replacement part has a visible, nonfunctional design component 
protected by a patent.  For example, an independent manufacturer 
could not produce a lookalike aftermarket bumper for a car that was an 
exact copy but would have to make its appearance sufficiently 
different that it did not infringe the design patent.  This decision could 
effectively wipe out a large portion of the market for third party design 
 
13235 U.S.C. §271(d)(4). The Kodak case got around the problem by 
reasoning that the provision merely codified existing law, although that did 
not explain why the court could impose a duty that neither the statute nor pre-
existing common law would have recognized.  Image Tech. Svces., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997). 
133 See the discussion of Kodak v. Image Tech. Services, supra, note __. 
134Automotive Body Parts Assn. (ABPA) v. Ford Global Tech., LLC, 930 
F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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of aftermarket parts.  Insurers often prefer third-party parts because 
they are less expansive.  Design patents are supposed to cover non-
functional features, which is an important distinction with utility 
patents.  In the past the Federal Circuit had been more sensitive to this 
problem – holding, for example, that a design patent on a key blade 
could not be enforced if its principal purpose was to make the key 
blade incompatible with locks made by others.135  This issue could be 
addressed by advocacy to the Federal Circuit, where most of these 
cases land on appeal.  Otherwise, new legislation may be needed to 
broaden the design patent statute’s exclusion of functional content. 
The other situation arises when the repair in question requires 
access to diagnostic software that is licensed to users subject to 
restrictions that effectively prohibit diagnostic use by third parties, 
including even the owner of the device. For example, John Deere has 
used such clauses in software licenses for some of its tractors.136  As a 
general matter the first sale doctrine does not apply because software 
is licensed, not sold.  Two doctrines that could be applied, however, 
are copyright misuse and fair use. 
IP “misuse” occurs when the owner of an IP right places 
restrictions that are thought to impair competition unreasonably, even 
though they might not be antitrust violations.137  For example, in 
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,138 the Fourth Circuit found 
copyright misuse in a software license for a design package that 
prevented the licensee from designing any competing software.  While 
that agreement very likely did not violate the antitrust laws, it did 
impose an anticompetitive restraint on the use of the software product 
 
135Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
136 For a good survey of the issues, including discussion of John Deere’s 
restriction on tractor repairs, see Nicholar A. Mirr, Defending the Right to 
Repair: An Argument for Federal Legislation Guaranteeing the Right to 
Repair, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2193 (2020). 
137 See Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 
905-14 (describing the history of copyright misuse). 
138911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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at issue.  Or in Assessment Techs., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.139 judge 
Posner – who never read misuse law expansively140 – struck down as 
“akin to misuse” the attempt by an owner of a copyrighted database to 
use it in such a way as to restrict unreasonably access to 
uncopyrightable data contained in the database.  In this case the 
database was designed to store property tax data and tax assessors used 
it to collect this data.  As a result, the only way to access the tax data 
was by using the database, which the owner denied. 
The Wiredata case seems quite relevant.  The farmer in 
question, or her service provider, wants access to the software not to 
make pirated copies but only to read it in order to diagnose the tractor 
that the farmer already owns. 
An alternative to the same result is the doctrine of fair use, 
recently expanded by the Supreme Court in Google, LLC v. Oracle 
America, Inc.141  That decision found fair use in Google’s copying of 
application programming interface code in an Oracle software.  In the 
right to repair situation, by contrast, the service provider or owner of 
the device seeks to use it only to make a repair. 
The FTC has already addressed some of these issues in a 
Report on the right to repair, issued in May, 2021.142 That report 
recommends new legislation, which may be necessary for many 
 
139350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).  For additional analysis of the problem 
see CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 265-258 
(2013). 
140E.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc. 694 F2d 505, 510-512 (9th Cir. 1982). 
141141 S.Ct. 1183 (2021).  See also Chamberlain Group v. Skylink tech., 381 
F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (neither copyright act nor digital millennium 
copyright act prohibited a competitor from simply reading the plaintiff’s code 
in order to make a compatible garage door opener). 
142 FTC, Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restriction 
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situations.  The discussion here simply observes that current legislation 
will address at least a part of the problem. 
Agriculture; Packers and Stockyard Act (PSA) and Agricultural 
Seed 
The EO instructs the Secretary of Agriculture to consider 
practices in agricultural markets and ways to improve enforcement of 
the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA).143  That statute, which is not 
part of the antitrust laws, is enforced by the Secretary of Agriculture, 
although delinquent penalties may be recovered by the Attorney 
General.144  Under a related statute a private person who is injured by 
a violation of the PSA or certain related orders of the Secretary of 
Agriculture may obtain single damages, and expressly provides that an 
injured plaintiff may also sue under state law.145  In addition, the 
Secretary may Act upon the complaint of a private plaintiff or a 
state.146 
The statute prohibits unfair and deceptive practices, as well as 
such practices as manipulating or controlling prices or giving “undue 
preferences” for some participants over other.  The broad and vague 
language led Chief Justice Taft to describe the Act in 1922 as treating 
United States stockyards as “great national public utilities.”147  More 
recently, the courts have responded to this statutory breadth by reading 
into it market power and competitive harm requirements akin to those 
contained in the antitrust laws.148 Many of the covered practices 
 
143EO, note __, at 36,992-93. 
1447 USC §§192, 213, 215-216.  For coverage under the statute, see §3A 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶363 (5th ed. 
2021).  See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Does the Packers and Stockyards Act 
Require Antitrust Harm? (SSRN Working Paper 2011), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737440. 
145 7 U.S.C. §209. 
146 7 U.S.C. §210. 
147 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922). 
148 E.g., in re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 728 F.3d 457 (5th Cir 2013) (reading 
statute narrowly to as to impose competitive harm requirements analogous to 
those created by the Sherman Act.). 
40 Hovenkamp, Executive Order on Competition July, 2021 
 
resemble business torts more than antitrust violation, and the statute 
was drafted so as to treat them that way.  In Terry v. Tyson Farms, 
Inc.,149 however, the court decided that Tyson’s alleged practice of 
underweighing chickens presented to it by contract growers did not 
violate the act because it did not cause injury to competition.   But the 
deceptive practices provision in the statute contains no competitive 
injury requirement. 
Decisions such as Terry are incorrectly reading antitrust-like 
competitive harm requirements into the PSA. The first two subsections 
of the statute contain no market power or competitive injury 
requirement at all.150 The subsequent three sections do contain a 
competitive harm requirement.151  Clearly it is inconsistent with the 
 
149 604 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2010). 
150Substantive violations are enumerated in 7 U.S.C. §192: 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any packer or swine contractor 
with respect to livestock, meats, meat food products, or 
livestock products in unmanufactured form, or for any 
live poultry dealer with respect to live poultry, to: 
(a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly 
discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device; 
or 
(b) Make or give any undue or unreasonable 
preference or advantage to any particular person 
or locality in any respect, or subject any 
particular person or locality to any undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any 
respect; or… 
1517 U.S.C. §192: 
(c) Sell or otherwise transfer to or for any other 
packer, swine contractor, or any live poultry 
dealer, or buy or otherwise receive from or for 
any other packer, swine contractor, or any live 
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language of the statute to read the competitive harm provisions into the 
first two subsections. Terry action was under the first subsection.  As 
a result, this concern of President Biden’s EO is clearly supported by 
the existing statute without amendment.  If the statute is opened up to 
become more tort-like in its approach, the amount of litigation will 
certainly increase, effectively expanding the reach of federal law into 
agricultural business torts. 
 Finally, the EO briefly refers to ensuring that the intellectual 
property system does not unnecessarily reduce competition in seed 
“beyond that reasonably contemplated by the Patent Act”152 and also 
by the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.153 
 
 
poultry dealer, any article for the purpose or 
with the effect of apportioning the supply 
between any such persons, if such 
apportionment has the tendency or effect of 
restraining commerce or of creating a 
monopoly; or 
(d) Sell or otherwise transfer to or for any other 
person, or buy or otherwise receive from or for 
any other person, any article for the purpose or 
with the effect of manipulating or controlling 
prices, or of creating a monopoly in the 
acquisition of, buying, selling, or dealing in, any 
article, or of restraining commerce; or 
(e) Engage in any course of business or do any act for the 
purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controlling 
prices, or of creating a monopoly in the acquisition of, 
buying, selling, or dealing in, any article, or of restraining 
commerce;… 
(emphasis added). 
152 35 U.S.C. 
153 7 U.S.D. §§2321-2582. 
42 Hovenkamp, Executive Order on Competition July, 2021 
 
Conclusion 
 President Biden’s efforts to restore the American economy 
have pointed consistently in one direction, which is getting economic 
output up.  High output benefits consumers with lower prices.  It 
benefits labor and other suppliers with increased work opportunities 
and greater competitiveness in job markets, and it benefits business 
overall as well. 
 The goal the antitrust laws is also to promote maximum output 
in the individual markets where antitrust claims are addressed.  
Antitrust should be not be a device for punishing firms or for making 
them less productive just in order to satisfy some noneconomic goal.  
One feature of this approach is that it can be quite tolerant of large 
firms, provided that they do not behave anticompetitively.  Sometimes 
it is tempting to look back nostalgically at the age of Brandeis and 
admire the protection of small firms from the incursions of chain stores 
and organized distribution.  But that movement failed miserably at it 
should have – for the simple reason that customers did not prefer it.  
By contrast, anticompetitive practices need to be carefully 
investigated, prosecuted where appropriate, and enjoined.  That is 
where antitrust policy can create the most, and most widely distributed, 
benefits. 
